INTRODUCTION (757 WORDS)
 41 
42
What do humans know about their motor actions? And can they judge accurately their own 43 movements? 44
A key feature of our cognitive system is the ability to monitor the accuracy of its own 45 processing, a cognitive function generally described as metacognition (Fleming & Frith, 2014) . This 46 ability translates into a degree of confidence associated with each of our actions and decisions. It 47 remains debated whether metacognitive judgments in different tasks rely on distinct specialized 48 cognitive modules specific to each task or rather depend on a common single metacognitive function. 49
Since the ability to judge our performance strongly depends on how good we are at performing a task 50 in the first place ( one could argue that humans have better metacognitive representations of their own movements than 67 of external events. This argument is based on privileged access to information about our own self 68 (Hart, 1965; Metcalfe & Greene, 2007) . Indeed, knowing with precision the degree of certainty about 69 limb position and bodily state is crucial for our survival and one could hypothesize that therefore we 70 have better metacognitive access to these types of information than for any other type of signal. On 71 the other hand, experimental data seem to suggest that humans have surprisingly first-level awareness 72 about their own actions and somatic states (Garfinkel et al., 2015) It has been shown for instance that 73 humans have relatively low accuracy in proprioceptive judgment, since strong illusions regarding 74 limb position or body ownership are readily created by altering visual feedback (Blanke, Slater, & 75 Serino, 2015). Fourneret & Jeannerod confirmed that participants could remain dramatically unaware 76 of well-organized movement adjustments (Fourneret & Jeannerod, 1998 Zoest & Donk, 2010) . These results fit with the view that coordinated motor 80 behaviours are often controlled unconsciously by specialized spinal and cerebellar circuits operating 81 outside of awareness. This has led some authors to propose that motor awareness is confined to 82 initiation of actions and evaluation of outcomes, with only limited access to motor commands 83 themselves (Blakemore & Frith, 2003; Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2002) . In sum, we normally 84 know that we prepare and initiate action, and we know from sensory feedback whether our actions 85 produce the intended outcome or not, but we have little access to the details of voluntary movements 86 themselves (Haggard, 2017) . 87
To our knowledge, no study has formally investigated metacognition for one's own actions. 88
In the present study, we investigated whether metacognitive abilities for perception of voluntary 89 
MATERIAL & METHODS

113
Participants
114
Twenty-nine right-handed participants were recruited (mean age = 22.62, SD = 2.7). The robotic 115 device had limited power, so we selected participants with small hands. As a result, the majority 116 (27/29) were female. Technical difficulties with the robotic arm prevented full testing of two 117 participants. Their data were not analyzed. Two other participants were excluded as they presented 118 strong response bias (responding ahead or behind in more than 75% of trials) that precluded 119 meaningful signal detection analysis. Therefore, the final sample included 25 participants (24 female, 120 mean age = 22.4, SD = 2.5). All participants had normal hearing, normal or corrected-to-normal 121 vision, and no psychiatric or neurological history. They were naive to the purpose of the study and 122 gave informed consent. The study was approved by the university ethical committee. 123 Participants viewed the screen in front of them, and were instructed not to look directly at their hand. 131
Movement task
They were shown the position of their finger in the form a green dot of 4.3 mm diameter that they 132 could move. On the screen, a white rectangular frame of 40 x 70 mm was presented, with top and 133 bottom edges being bounded by a 7mm grey zone, and with a central red cross. 134
Participants were instructed to move between the two bounds of the frame at a constant speed, 135 between 3.71 and 9.63 cm per second. Feedback on the velocity of the finger movement was given by 136 the changes in colour of the green dot showing their finger position (blue = too slow, red = too fast). 137
Participants had approximately three minutes to familiarize moving using this arrangement. After the 138 training, participants were instructed to reproduce the same types of movement during the main 139 experiment.
Trial procedure
141
After the training phase, participants were instructed regarding the main task, starting with the 142 Active condition. At the beginning of each trial, participants moved the index finger to bring the green 143 cursor onto the central red cross. An arrow indicated whether the first movement should be a flexion 144 or extension. They then made movements back and forth between the bounds of the white frame. 145
Each time their finger reached the bound of the frame, the bound changed from grey to yellow, 146 indicating a change of direction was required. 147
Each trial involved three successive and continuous movements back and forth. During the first 148 movement, from the center of the screen to the bound designated by the arrow, the green cursor 149 continuously displayed the finger position. During the second movement, the green dot suddenly 150 disappeared at a random location. The bound still changed from grey to yellow when touched, 151 indicating when to change movement direction. During the third movement, a probe, represented by a 152 blue dot of a diameter equal to the green dot appeared while a brief tone was played through 153 headphones. Importantly, the probe appeared ahead or behind of the moving finger. Participants 154 finished their movement, indicated by the last bound turning red. Then, the blue dot and frame 155 disappeared and the words "Ahead" and "Behind" were displayed on each side of the screen. 156
Participants responded to indicate whether the probe had appeared ahead or behind of their 157 instantaneous finger position, by pressing one of two keys with the left hand. The response was 158 unspeeded. Finally, the question "How confident are you in your response?" was displayed on the 159 screen with the number 1 to 4 displayed underneath, 4 corresponding to maximal confidence. Initially, 160 one random number was circled and participants moved the circle by pressing keys with the left hand, 161 using a third key to register their confidence judgment. 162
To ensure that participants did not change the velocity of their movements, trials were interrupted 163 when participants exceeded a speed of 16.96 cm per second. Trials could also be interrupted if people 164 did not respect the imposed first movement direction or if they stopped moving too soon after the 165 probe appeared. Participants were explicitly told that those interruptions were no errors but only 166 means to improve their performance in the discrimination task. 167
The gap between the instantaneous finger position and the probe was adjusted to control task 168 difficulty (see staircasing procedure). "Behind" and "Ahead" trials were randomly intermixed. 169
Importantly, for both types of trials, the probe appeared at a random location chosen uniformly within 170 the same central region of the frame, so that its position could not be used to predict the required 171 response. This central region was defined so that the probe could never appear less distant to the 172 bounds than the maximal gap distance recorded for that block.
Movement replay
Participants started the experiment with a training block of active trials, the 2-D coordinates of the 175 position of the finger being recorded every millisecond. Next, they received instructions for passive 176 trials. The passive trials followed the same procedure as the active trials, except that participants were 177 instructed to keep their finger relaxed and avoid any voluntary movement. Instead, the robotic device 178 reproduced a previous movement made by the participant. In order to check that no voluntary 179 movement interfered with the robot's command, movement's trajectories with a velocity inferior or 180 superior to 10% of the required velocity were stopped and the trial was restarted. As before, 181 participants judged whether the probe was presented ahead or behind of their finger position, and 182 reported their confidence in that judgment. 183
In the visual condition, participants were instructed to not move their finger at all. The trajectory 184 of a previous active movement was replayed on the screen in a similar way, but the finger and device 185 remained still. Participants had now to judge whether the probe was presented ahead or behind of the 186 calculated position of the green dot, based only on visual-temporal cues such as the initial movement 187 path displayed, and the colour change of the bounding zones. conditions, we retrieved the second-order criteria fitted for the computation of the meta-d' for each 238 participant and each condition. Note that as confidence was reported on a 4-point scale in the 239 experiment, we obtained three separate criteria, for the 1-2, 2-3 and 3-4 boundaries respectively, 240 independently for "ahead" and "behind" responses. We then computed absolute distance of the 241 criteria to the first-order decision threshold for each response side, to provide a measure of how 242 participants rated their confidence according to the level of internal evidence. For example, if a 243 participant set the 3-4 confidence boundary very close to the first order decision criterion, then a very 244 small degree of evidence would make them highly confident. As sensitivity and bias might vary 245 across participants and conditions, we designed a normalization procedure which would allow us to 246 determine how optimally participants' confidence ratings tracked accuracy of their first-order 247
decisions. 248
To do this, we developed a method to measure the optimal confidence criterion of each 249 participant and estimate how they positioned their actual confidence criterion relative to that optimal 250 criterion ( and found the maximum of this difference, establishing the optimal second-order criterion (Figure 2 , 259 red circle) allowing to report high confidence with the highest hit rate and the lowest false-alarm rate 260 (see Figure S1 for simulations of the optimal confidence criterion for different values of d' and first-261 order criterion). We then retrieved how the criteria corresponding to each confidence rating 262 boundaries (Figure 2 , blue triangles) were positioned compared to this optimal criterion. To do so, we 263 normalized the criterion values by the distance between the optimal second-order criterion and the 264 first-order criterion so that this distance would correspond to a unit of one. Therefore, according to 265 that measure, the zero value would correspond to the position of the first-order decision threshold (c1) 266 and a value of one would correspond to the position of the optimal second-order decision threshold. 267
This expresses how confidence criteria are placed on the decision axis in a way that is meaningful 268 irrespective of first-order sensitivity and bias, though the method is potentially affected by the quality 269 of the fitting of the meta-d' quantity. For clarity, we averaged together criterion of each response side 270 ("ahead"/"behind"), and transformed to values a logarithmic scale for statistical comparison. 
criterion and meta-d' value (black dots). To do so, we varied along the decision-axis the position of a 276
second-order "confidence criterion" distinguishing low and high confidence trials and calculated the 277 resulting proportions of second-order hits (HIT2 = p(High Confidence|Correct) and second-order 278 false alarms (FA2 = p(High Confidence|Error). We then retrieved the difference between these HIT2 279 and FA2 rates (C-D) to find the second-order confidence criterion that maximized that difference. 280
This value corresponds to the position of the second-order criterion (red dot) that allows to separate 281 optimally error and correct trials for that particular value of meta-d' and first-order bias. We used 282 that "optimal confidence criterion" to normalize the values of actual criteria found for that 283 participants (blue squares). 284
Predictors of accuracy and confidence
285
We investigated whether accuracy and confidence were influenced by the same factors and 286 whether differences between the influence of these factors were observed across condition. To do so, 287
we used multiple linear regression performed separately for each participant and each condition to 288 determine the parameters that influenced response choice (ahead/behind), accuracy, and confidence. 289
The regressors used, and a justification of their inclusion, are given in supplementary table 1. As someof these predictors were collinear (for instance the finger and probe position were r), we used a least 291 absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO, Tibshirani, 1996) regression which selects 292 predictors and regularizes the linear model by assigning null values to redundant predictors. 293
To determine which factors influenced response choice, accuracy and confidence while avoiding 294 instability in the estimation of the linear model, we transformed categorical predictors into continuous 295 variables and used a bootstrapping approach. To do so, we randomly partitioned the total number of 296 trials into 18 subsets of 10 trials and computed the average value of each regressor for each subset, 297
allowing to obtain continuous values for each parameter (Wokke, Cleeremans, & Ridderinkhof, 298 2017). We then estimated the best linear model using LASSO regression and retrieved the beta values 299 associated with each predictor for that model. We repeated this procedure 1000 times based on 300 different random partitions of the data. We then computed the mean beta value over all repetitions and 301 divided by the standard deviation of the beta distribution to obtain one beta estimate for each 302 parameter and each participant (normalized beta value). We then tested whether the betas associated 303 with each predictor differed from 0 across participants using a t-test approach. 
Accuracy, task difficulty & Confidence
309
The goal of the present experiment was to explore the contribution of voluntary motor command 310 and proprioceptive information in motor awareness and metacognitive judgments. To do so we used a 311 planned comparison approach, contrasting judgments on active and passive movements to determine 312 the contribution of motor command to movement perception and comparing judgments on passive 313 movements and visual trajectories to test the contribution of proprioceptive information to movement 314 perception. 315
We first investigated whether our manipulation to equate performance across conditions was 316 successful. This was achieved by using a 2down-1up staircase procedure adjusting the gap distance 317 between the probe and the actual finger position (see Methods), smaller distances increasing the 318 difficulty of the task. Although no large differences in accuracy were observed between conditions, 319 accuracy remained significantly higher in the Active condition than in the Passive ( Figure 3A although no difference in accuracy was observed between these two conditions. 331
Response-time (RT) were overall slower in the Visual than in the Active ( Figure 3D 3) revealed that these differences they were not due to voluntary change in the movement in theActive condition but to a better estimation of the finger trajectory when based on voluntarily motor 339 command than on proprioceptive feedback or visuo-temporal cues alone. 340 
341
Figure 3: Boxplot of Accuracy, Gap (probe-finger distance), Confidence and Response time. A: 342
Percentage of correct responses in the Active (red), Passive (blue) and Visual (green) conditions 343 across trials and participants. B: Gap distance between the position of the probe and the actual finger 344
position. Gap value was adjusted on a trial-by trial basis following a staircase procedure to equate 345 decision accuracy between conditions. Smaller gap values indicate increased task difficulty. C: 346
Confidence ratings (1-4 scale) for each conditions, across trials and participants. D: Response-time 347 for each conditions, across trials and participants. For all plots, central mark indicates the median, 348 and the bottom and top edges of the box indicate the 25th and 75th percentiles. Top black bars
4). 374
Overall, these results show that when making a judgment on the position of a moving object, 375 whether simply observing the movement, being moved passively or making the movement 376 voluntarily, no difference was observed in metacognitive abilities once task difficulty was properly 377 controlled. 385 We further investigated whether first-and second-order sensitivity correlated between 386 conditions, potentially suggesting a common factor underlying perceptual and metacognitive 387 judgements in all three conditions (see Figure S4 and table S1 for full results). We found that d' 388 correlated significantly between all conditions (all p < 10-3), as did meta-d' (all p < 0.02). At the first-order level, no bias towards "Ahead" or "Behind" responses were observed, first-398 order decision criterion being centred on 0 in all the conditions (see Figure S5 and corresponding 399 paragraph in the supplementary results). Furthermore, we found a significant correlation in the first-400 order decision threshold between each pair of conditions (all p < 0.001) suggesting that biases in 401 decision threshold were shared between Active, Passive and Visual tasks ( Figure S9) . 402
Figure 4: First-order sensitivity, second-order sensitivity and metacognitive efficiency. Violin plot of 380 d' measures (A,) meta-d' measures (B) and meta-d'/d' ratio (C) across participants for Active (red), 381
Passive (blue) and Visual (green) conditions. Full dots represent individual values. Black circle
Turning to potential biases in confidence ratings, we first estimated raw confidence ratings in 403 error and correct trials in each condition ( Figure S6 ). We found that average confidence in error and 404 correct trials differed across conditions: participants were more confident in their correct responses in 405 the Active than in the Passive (t(24) = 2.61, p = 0.015, d = 0.52, BF01 = 0.35) and in the Visual (t(24) 406 = 3.65, p < 10e-3, d = 0.73, BF01 = 0.038) conditions. Conversely, they were less confident when 407 they actually made an error in the Visual compared to the Active (t(24) = 3.27, p < 10e-3, d = 0.65, 408 BF01 = 0.09) and the Passive (t(24) = 3.35, p < 10e-3, d = 0.67, BF01 = 0.075) conditions. As no 409 differences in metacognitive efficiency were observed between those conditions, we expected these 410 differences to result from a change in confidence bias across conditions. 411
Second-order signal detection theory proposes that different levels of confidence is obtained 412 by placing additional second-order criteria on either side of the first-order decision criterion. If the 413 evidence falls close to the first-order decision boundary, the confidence in the response will be rated 414 as low. If on the other hand the evidence falls farther from the decision boundary, the response will be 415 labelled as made with high confidence (Maniscalco & Lau, 2012 . A similar model can be used 416 when confidence is not just rated as High or Low but with graded levels, as in the present study. In 417 that case, one criterion is fitted for each boundary between confidence ratings (see also figure 5). 418
To analyse differences in how confidence criteria were set among conditions, we retrieved the 419 second-order criteria fitted for the computation of the meta-d' for each confidence rating boundary 420 and calculated their absolute distance to the decision threshold for each response side. In order to 421 understand how the criteria were positioned on the decision axis, we compared those values to the 422 position of an optimal confidence criterion calculated for each participant and each condition 423 according to their meta-d' and first-order decision criteria. This optimal criterion was defined as the 424 criterion value allowing for the greater difference between the proportion of Correct trials associated 425 with high confidence (HIT2) and lower proportion of Errors associated with high confidence (FA2) 426 (See Methods). We use that value to normalize participant's second-order criteria, allowing us to 427 compute a measure of criterion shift independent of both first-order accuracy and first-order criterion. 428
For clarity, we averaged both response side ("ahead"/"behind") together and used a logarithmic scale 429 to assess differences between conditions (an analysis of the criteria before normalization can be found 430 in supplementary material, Figure S7) . 431 We found that the boundary between confidence ratings 2 and 3 was placed the closest to the 432 optimal confidence criterion (corresponding to a value of 1 on Figure 5A Taken together, these results suggest that participants were progressively more liberal in their 454 confidence judgments across conditions: at equal levels of evidence for a first-order decision, they 455 were significantly more likely to give higher confidence ratings in the Active than in the Passive 456 condition, and in the Passive than the Visual condition. Additional analysis confirmed this shift in 457 criterion was not entirely explained by a change in first-order accuracy ( Figure S8 ) as no correlation 458 was observed between the difference in second-order criteria and the change in accuracy between 459 conditions. Interestingly however, a positive correlation was found in the average position of the 460 second-order criteria across conditions, suggesting that some common process underlay confidence 461 rating across conditions ( Figure S9 ). 462 
Factors influencing accuracy and confidence
475
Finally, we wanted to shed some light on the factors that influenced first-level performance 476 and second-level metacognition in each condition. To do so, we used multiple linear regression 477 performed separately for each participant to determine the parameters that influenced accuracy and 478 confidence. The list of regressors, and a rational for their inclusion, is shown in table 1. Because of 479 possible redundancy and multicollinearity between regressors, we used a LASSO regression approach 480 (Tibshirani, 1996) which sets to 0 redundant predictors, therefore reducing effect of collinearity. 481
As an initial sanity check, we first considered which factors predicted "ahead" vs "behind" 482 response choice ( Figure 6A ). As might be expected, the relative position of the probe compared to the 483 finger correlated with response choice, explaining more variance than the actual correct response 484 (Ahead or Behind). More surprisingly, longer RTs were associated with "behind" responses, 485
suggesting that inattention or difficulty in responding were associated with poor predictive 486 representation of hand position. 487
We next explored predictors of decision accuracy ( Figure 6B ). First, we found that RT 488 correlated with accuracy, more errors being committed for longer RTs, as might be expected. 489
Unsurprisingly, accuracy was also predicted by the distance between the probe and the finger position 490 (Gap), larger gaps predicting more correct responses. More surprisingly, we found that the closer the 491 finger was from the bound of the box (Finger distance to centre), the more participants made errors. 492
This result is surprising as the required response was actually more predictable when the finger was 493 closer to the bound, making the task easier for those trials. 494
Our main interest lay in how the same model explained confidence judgments ( Figure 6C) . 495 We found that confidence decreased with longer RT. Interestingly however, beta values were 496 significantly higher than for accuracy (t-test for each condition, all p < 10 -3 ), suggesting a stronger 497 impact of RT on confidence. We found that larger gap values correlated with higher confidence but 498
the beta values were significantly lower than for accuracy (t-test for each condition, all p < 10 -3 ). 499
Regarding the impact of finger position, confidence followed the pattern of accuracy, being 500 significantly lower when the finger was more distant to the centre. This suggests that participants 501 were aware that they were making more mistakes for trials in which the finger was far from the 502 centre, this factor having a similar impact on confidence and on accuracy (t-test for each condition, all 503 p > 0.08). Surprisingly however, we found that participants reported stronger confidence when the 504 probe appeared farther from the centre, although this predictor did not correlate with accuracy. This 505 result seems to suggest that participants made false assumptions about the difficulty of the decision 506 according to the position of the probe. 507
Overall, these analyses showed that many factors influencing response accuracy also influenced 508 confidence, confirming participants were at least partially aware of what caused them to make errors. 509
Interestingly, some parameters seemed to impact only confidence, reflecting incorrect beliefs 510 influencing the difficulty of the task. In particular, a purely visual feature of our probe task which was 511 unrelated to actual perceptual performance had a significant influence on confidence suggesting a 512 form of metacognitive 'hallucination'. We speculate that the visually salient event of a highly 513 eccentric probe lead to a high confidence, even though this visual information was irrelevant to the 514 task. Importantly, no significant differences were found across conditions on how these parameters 515 influenced accuracy and confidence. 516 
DISCUSSION (138WORDS)
527
In the present study, we investigated the metacognitive abilities related to voluntary actions and 528 passive movement perception, and a baseline condition involving visual information only. Our 529 systematic study revealed several novel findings. First, although the accuracy of first-order decisions 530 increased slightly for voluntary compared to passive movements and visual perception, no differences 531 in metacognitive efficiency was observed between tasks when controlling for these variations in first-532 order accuracy. Second, metacognitive sensitivity and bias in confidence judgments were correlated 533 between tasks across individuals, suggesting that a common process underlay metacognitive judgment 534 for voluntary actions, passive movement and for purely visual decisions. Third, our results revealed 535 that participants were more biased towards higher confidence ratings when judging their own 536 voluntary movements then when judging movements executed passively, or when judging a visual 537 replay of their movement. This result suggests an element of over-confidence when making 538 judgements about one's own actions. Finally, regression analyses suggested that participants had 539 partially wrong beliefs about the factors influencing their accuracy, and used irrelevant task 540 parameters as proxies when giving confidence ratings. Taken together, these results suggest that 541 confidence judgements about voluntary actions involve biased estimates of accuracy. 542
The main objective of the present study was to determine whether there were differences in 543 metacognitive abilities when judging voluntary movements, passive displacement of the limbs or 544 when making decision about the movement of visual objects. We did not find differences in 545 metacognitive sensitivity associated with these three types of judgment. Accuracy and metacognitive 546 efficiency correlated strongly across tasks, recalling recent findings of a correlation in metacognitive 547 judgment across sensory modalities (Faivre et Could an alternative hypothesis explain the absence of differences in metacognitive sensitivity 555 between the three tasks? One possibility is that the similarities at the metacognitive level are due to 556 the similarities of the task in the three conditions. Indeed, all decisions required to judge the position 557 of a probe compared the position of a moving object, relying either exclusively on temporal and visual 558 cues, proprioceptive feedback or voluntary motor command. As all movements were replays of 559 movements executed previously by the participant, it is therefore possible that participants relied on 560 motor predictions in all three conditions to judge the relative position of the probe. Another 561 alternative hypothesis is that metacognitive sensitivity differs between action perception and 562 exteroception only when judging the overall success of the action, rather than the actual spatial path of 563 the movement. Indeed, it has been proposed that motor awareness is dominated by representation of 564 the goal of the action rather than representing the actual movement trajectory (Blakemore & Frith, 565 2003; Blakemore et al., 2002) . Therefore, it is possible that, despite the results presented here, 566 metacognitive sensitivity is increased when monitoring action success compared to spatial path. 567
While further studies will be necessary to assess the fine contribution of motor predictions in 568 metacognition of action, our findings confirm its importance in motor awareness. Performance was 569 significantly increased when judging voluntary actions, despite our efforts to equate accuracy between 570 conditions. In that respect, our result seems in accordance with the findings of a previous study 571
showing that movement perception is improved for active compared to passive movements (Farrer, Despite not observing a difference in metacognitive sensitivity, we observed a difference in 576 confidence bias across conditions. Overall, we found that participants tended to be more confident 577 when judging their own voluntary actions than when judging passive finger displacement or visual 578 trajectories of their own movements, placing their confidence criterion closer to the decision 579 threshold. Importantly, this result did not appear to be only a consequence of the pattern of 580 performance across conditions as the effect was observed when normalizing shift in confidence by an 581 estimate of the optimal positioning of the criterion for that condition and that participant and the 582 change in confidence criterion did not correlate with the increase in performance. 583
These analyses depend on individuals' use of the confidence scale provided, so should be 584 interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, we found that participants tended to be overconfident when 585 judging their voluntary actions. What could be the basis of this bias? One possibility is that 586 participants judged a priori that the Active condition was easier than the others, shifting their overall 587 confidence towards higher ratings. Indeed, as the architecture of the task corresponded to an additive 588 design, more information being gradually available from the Visual condition to the Active condition, 589 participants might have make the corresponding prediction that they were performing gradually better 590 in each condition. However, our finding that the shift of criterion did not correlate with the increase in 591 performance ( Figure S8 ) suggests that this hypothesis does not fully account for our results. An 592 alternative account of these findings could be that this shift in criterion reflects a specific bias in 593 confidence when judging our own movement and voluntary action. In that sense, it could echo the 594 known overconfidence bias in introspective abilities, people believing they are better judge of their 595 own actions than external observers (Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977 ). An illusion of aprivileged access to the information guiding our behaviour and the preeminence of intentions in 597 perceiving our actions is thought be one of the cause of illusory perception of control over external 598 events (Wegner, 2004) as well as of the illusory increased self-agency caused by subliminal priming 599 (Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009 ). This phenomenon of "apparent mental causation" can be linked 600 to the "intentional binding" phenomenon which makes participants experience the consequences of 601 their voluntary actions as happening sooner in time than normal (Kühn, Brass, & Haggard, 2013) . In 602 that respect, our finding of a confidence bias for voluntary action compared to exteroception fits with 603 the view that volition potentially distorts action perception. 604
Finally, the present study also shed some lights on the factors influencing decision accuracy and 605 confidence. Unsurprisingly, we found that both accuracy and confidence were influenced by 606 parameters related to task difficulty, in particular the gap distance between the probe and the finger 607 position, and the time taken to make a response, showing that participants were at least partially aware 608 of the difficulty of the decision to make and its consequence on their response choice. Furthermore, 609
confidence also correctly reflected some other parameters influencing decision accuracy such as the 610 position of the finger at the time of the apparition of the probe. Interestingly however, confidence also 611 varied with some parameters that did not actually impacted accuracy: participants reported higher 612 confidence when the probe appeared further from the center although they did not appear to be more 613 correct for those trials. Such finding speaks in favour of a dissociation between choice and 614 confidence, suggesting some visual cues altered confidence specifically. This result is of particular 615 interest as it shows that some irrelevant information can impact confidence, in accordance with 616 findings that confidence does not simply reflect the continued processing of the same evidence that 617 
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